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This research inquiry concludes that the "Fourth Service of
Supply" is practically here today—not as a separabo military department
but as an agency under the Secretary of Defense with civilian control
and staffed by military personnel of the three military department s*
This agency is the Armed Forces Supply Support Center and Council which,
if a 1961 report is approved, is considered to be the core of a hybrid
"Fourth Service*"
The inquiry discussed broadly the many ideas and proposals that
have been associated with a "Fourth Service of Supply," with emphasis on
what has transpired in the last tvn decades* The political pressures for
a single agency managing supplies and services are examined with important
milestones chronicled. Particular stress is placed on proposals by the
Congress and the lb over Commission of 1955 for a single agency managing
military materiel*
The Department of Defense Tiateriel Management Improvement Programs
are succinctly described, They consist primarily of the single-manager-
ships and represent DoD's counter-arguments against a "Fourth Service,"
The success of these programs, however, have not stifled Congressional
pressures for a single, centralised supply agency*
The inquiry discusses pros and cons relative to a "Fourth
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All INQUIRY OOHCEHHIHG A "FOURTH SERVICE OF SUPPLY"
By CDR Oreath Smiley, SC, USN
This research inquiry concludes that the "Fourth Service of
Supply" is practically here today—not as a separate military department
bat as an agency under the Secretary of Defense with civilian control
and staffed by military personnel of the three military departments.
This agency is the Armed Forces Supply Support Center and Council which,
if a 1961 report is approved, is considered to be the core of a hybrid
"Fourth Service."
The inquiry discussed broadly the many ideas and proposals that
have been associated with a "Fourth Service of Supply," with emphasis on
what has transpired in the last t'.vo decades* The political pressures for
a single agency managing supplies and services are examined with important
milestones chronicled. Particular stress is placed on proposals by the
Congress and the Hoover Ooiarai ssion of 1955 for a single agency managing
military materiel©
The Department of Defense Materiel Management Improvement Programs
are succinctly described. They consist primarily of the single-manager-
ships and represent DoD's counter-arguments against a "Fourth Service."
The success of these programs, however, have not stifled Congressional
pressures for a single, centralised supply agency*
The inquiry discusses pros and cons relative to a "Fourth
Service" and strongly indicates that it, "literally or figuratively, is
the Congressional goal.
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A spectre hovering in the background of discussions pertaining to
the organization and management of the armed forces has been the concept
labelled, "A Fourth Service of Supply*" The concept received emphasis
during Congressional hearings on unification in 1944 and subsequently in
the Ifcover Commission Report of 1955 Even today strong recommendations
are emanating from Congressional committees for the centralization of
supply and service functions in an agency of the "Fourth Service" type.
To understand better the "Fourth Service" concept and to document
salient features of the varied ideas that have been proposed and opposed
is the purpose of this inquiry, Uhile proponents of a centralized agen~
cy have been vociferous, the Department of Defense has been successful
in preventing the establishment of a fourth military department to ad-
minister supplies end services. In this inquiry, however, the many
meanings of the "Fourth Service" label are e:q?lored along -with the pros
and cons ezpressed by the Congress and the Defense Department,
The author has leaned heavily on Congressional reports in gather-
ing research material, While standards for efficiency, economy-, and
effectiveness are not delineated in these reports, Congress has been
quick to find fault with military supply functions. It seems apparent
that Congress believes that economy, efficiency, and effectiveness will
be substantially improved if supply and service functions are combined.
The writing of this inquiry has been stimulating and educational
for the author. It is hoped that the inquiry will be of benefit to






During the last tv/o decades particularly, a mass of vrritten data
has been generated "by military writers. Congressional leaders, and busi-
ness and professional research analysts on the proper management of the
military supplies and services which constitute the logistical system.
supporting the armed forces. Much of this emphasis in military supply
management stems from the many studies resulting from supply actions of
World '.Tar II and further from the growing realization by the Congress,
the armed forces, and the people that military logistics is costly and
important. The unification discussions throughout the land during these
last two decades have seen passage of the national Security Act of 1947
with subsequent amendments. The Department of Defense has been estab-
lished and a trend of centralisation within that department in military
supply management has been noted and well documented.
One of the prime general considerations in a research paper con-
cerning military supply management, or as in this case "A Fourth Service
of Supply" in particular, is the fact that no single, sensibly brief re-
port can be vrritten encompassing all facets of the subject. Consequent-
ly; parameters must be dravm to restrict the area to be studied in order
to present a realistic document that is vrorth.Thile to both the suthor
and the reader. Rather than stress this subject in intimate, profession-
al detail with emphasis on a single proposal in this area, this research
p£?er will present and discuss important milestones in a broad and
studied fashion concerning "A Fourth Service of Supply." In this respect,
"che boundaries of this discussion will not be considered in a narrow,
restricted sense with emphasis merely on a fourth military department per

se "but will consider the "Fourth Service" concept as it relates to the
centralisation of supply management within the Department of Defense*
The Trend Towards Centrali zation
From a managerial standpoint, many arguments have been presented
concerning the centralization versus decentralization organizational
alignment* The materiel bureaucracies within the Departmenb of Defense
are following a pattern of centralization long established in this coun-
try within the federal government. In this respect, Stahl points out
that "the long-time trend towards centralization* « *in the period since
the Civil ^ar, has operated to increase the oower and enhance the signi-
ficance of the bureaucracy*" This is similarly true in the last two
decades in the military organization for power and prestige in military
supply management has migrated from the individual services to the De-
partment of Defense*
This trend towards centralization in this area has been well mani-
fested hy the growing importance within the Department of Defense of the
role and function of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (installations
and Logistics)* TThile policy control and direction of the military sup-
ply systems prior to and during Tforld 7/ar II were lodged in the individual
military services, such policy control and direction has become concen-
trated in this Assistant Secretary* s Office. In addition, as will be
shown in this paper, actions are being taken almost daily to enhance and
strengthen his position in inspiring more integrated military materiel
management with centralization a concomitant result*
Let*s look at some of the more important milestones which have
0. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (fourth edition;
few York: Harpers and Brothers, 1955), p. 12*"

resulted in significant integration of materiel management in the armed
forces. The following is a list from a 1961 defense report:
Progress towards integrated management, while necessarily
evolutionary, is conbinuing and has been marked by certain
important milestones. Chief among these are:
The National Security Act of 1947, Public Lavr 253,
The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, Public Lav/- 413.
The Single Department Procurement Program of 1947.
The Plant Cognizance Program of 1947.
The First Hoover Commission, 1949,
The national Security Act Amendments of 1949, Public Lavr 216.
The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,
Public Lav; 152
.
DoD Excess Property Screening Program of 1949.
The Budgetary and Accounting Act of 1950, Public Lav; 784.
The Iftxnitions Board Study Projects of 1951.
The Defense Cataloging and Standardisation Act of 1952,
Public Lavr 556.
The 0*Mahoney Amendment of 1952, Public Lavr 433.
The Rockefeller Report of 1953 - DoD Reorganization Plan No. 3.
Basic Regulations for Military Supply Systems (DoD Directive
4000,8) of 1954.
The Second Hoover Commission Report, 1955.
The Single Manager Plan of 1956.
Establishment of Four Commodity Single Managers for Food,
Clothing, Medical, Petroleum, 1956,
The Interservice Supply Support Program of 1956.
The DoD Logistics Systems Study Projects of 1957-1958.
The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, with
KcCormack-Curtis Amendment.
Establishment of the Armed Forces Supply Support Center, 1958.
The Commodity Single Manager Evaluation Study of 1959.
Establishment of General Supplies and Industrial Supplies
Single Managers, 1959.
Defense Materiel Management Program of 1960.
Establishment of Construction Supplies and Automotive Supplies
Single Managers, I960,1
The grovring centralized importance of the Department of Defense in
military supply management cannot be ignored. This centralized im-
portance is well illustrated by the newest Department of Defense Directive
Armed Forces Supply Support Center, "Report on Management of
Electrical/Electronics Materiel," Tolume I, . Conclusions, Recommendations,
and Impact,
'
February, 1951, pp, 179-130, (ifcltilithed.
)

concerning the Assistant Secretary of Defense (installations and Lo-
gistics) which was signed 30 January 1961 by Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McIIamara, The responsibilities section of this directive de-
lineate the very broad functional interests of this Assistant Secretary,
They are:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense in
the following functional fields:
1, Materiel requirements,
2. Production planning and scheduling,
3, Acquisition, inventory management, storage, maintenance,
distribution, movement and disposal of materiel, supplies,
tools and equipment,
4. Small business matters*
5. Transportation, telecommunications, petroleum and other
logistical services,
6, Supply cataloging, standardization and quality control,
7# Commercial and industrial activities and facilities in-
cluding fixed industrial equipment,
8, Military construction including Reserve Forces Facilities.
9, Family housing,
10 # Real estate and real property including general purpose
space,
11, "Vulnerability of resources to attack damage.
Significant functions which have been assigned to this Assistant
Secretary include, among others, the following which set the stage for
further centralized control in the current evolutionary process wherein
is sought more efficient, effective, and economical supply management:
2. Develop systems and standards for the administration and
management of approved plans and programs,
5 # Recommend appropriate steps (including the transfer, re-
assignment, abolition and consolidation of functions) which will
provide in the Department of Defense for more effective, efficient,
and economical administr tion and operation, will eliminate un-
"Departmc-nt of Defense Directive 5126.22 of 30 January 1061,"
in Armed Forces Supply Support Center, "Report on Management of Electrical/
Electronics Materiel, ,f Volume I, Conclusions, Recommendations, and
Impact, February, 1361, pp. 149-150, (Lultilithed.)

necessary dupliro.t5.on, or will contribute to improved military
p reparedne s s , *•
The Magnitude of Supply Management
The Congress has long exhibited concern in the costs of the
military establishment and in the costs of its supply support* This is
emphasized thusly in a major Congressional report in 1957:
Of all its constitutional responsibilities, it is doubtful
if the Congress regards any as more important than its power
"to, • provide for the common Defence.* The cost of current
efforts to maintain our national security is approximately 10
percent of our gross national product and amounts to nearly five-
eights of the total of the national budget. Under such circum-
stances, the deep concern which the Congress feels in this matter
is readily understsndable 9 2
"While in 1957 military costs consumed approximately 10 percent of
our gross national product, a 1960 Congressional report stresses that
such spending is a significant determinant in the functioning of the
economy. In describing the magnitude of the defense organization, this
1960 report stated:
In the period just prior to the Korean conflict, defense
needs were a relatively smaller element than at present in the
economy$ amounting to §13 billion in fiscal year 1950, or about
5 percent of the gross national product. Since then military
requirements have absorbed at least double the proportion of the
Nation's product* The current rate of major national security
expenditures is §45,7 billion and accounts for 58 percent of
Government's entire budget expenditures.
This spending consumes more than 9 percent of our gross
national product and is a significant determinant in the function-
ing of the economy. From 1950 to 1959 while the Nation's volume
lMDepartment of Defense Directive 5125.22 of 30 January 1961,
in Armed Forces Supply Support Center, "Report on Management of Electrical/
Electronics Materiel," Volume I, Conclusions, Recommendations, and •
Impact, February, 1961, p.% 150,
2United States Congress, United Stat es Defense Fblicies Since
^
orid war II, House Document Uo. 100, 86tn" Congress, 1st Session
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. vii.

of business expanded 76.5 percent, Department of Defense
expenditures expanded 246.2 percent*-*-
Specifically,, "the Department of Defense (DoD) employes 3.6
million military and civilian persons and has real and personal property
of $150 billion on the basis of cost. Personal property alone is
valued at §118 billion and is made up of 3.4 & Uion items* M For each
of the four military services, the total number of military and civilian
supply personnel working in the Continental United States on the total
supply effort was 161,100 in 1957 of which some 52 percent vrere engaged
in activities related to common items of materiel.
The Congressional interests in the military supply programs have
resulted in many criticisms of the manner in which the armed forces
manage the logistics function. -Some 90 different categories of criticisms
and complaints relative to deficiencies in common supply within the
military departments vrere made by members of Congress over the period
1955-1957. These complaints vrere included under such broad captions as
(l) planning and requirements, (2) procurement, (3) production, (4)
supply management, (5) distribution, (6) personnel, and (7) other areas
4
which included some 23 miscellaneous categories.*
•United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement, Background Material on Economic Aspects of
Military Procurement and Supply, 86th Congress, 2d Session (vTashington:




^Department of Defense, "The Evaluation of Concepts for
Integration of the Military Supply Systems," Volume 1, Team 4, .
logistics Systems Study Project, 12 December 1957, p. 16. (Multilithed.
)
Department of Defense, "The Evaluation of Concents for the




It is further significant relative to this Congressional general
consideration that in 1960 and 1961 the following major committees of
the United States Congress have made, or are making, an investigation
and revievr of military supply management, mch of which originated from
the constant flow of criticisms of this area in the Washington environ-
ment :
Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations
Subcommittee, %use of Representatives, United States Congress. 1
Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement,
United States Congress.
2
Select Committee on Small Business, Senate, United States
Congress,^
Committee on Armed Services, fbuse of Representatives, United
States Congress »4
With these considerations in mind, the "Fourth Service of Supply"
concept in its very broadest connotation will be explored in subsequent
chapters of this research document. Herein let the reader consider the
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Government Operations, Military Supply Management (Progress in Single
Manager Agencies), nineteenth report by committee, 86th Congress 1st
Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, I960).
2
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement, Economi c Aspects on Military Procurement and
Supply, report of subcommittee," '8
6
th Congress, 2d Session ("Washington:
Government Printing Office, I960).
3
United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Small
Business, Case Study in Subcontracting ^crj Weapon-System Contractor,
report of Committee, 86th Congress, 2d Se s sion"(Vi'ashington : Government
Printing Office, I960).
United States Congress, House of Representatives, House Resolution
73, 37th Congress, 1st Session, authorising the Committee on Armed
Services to conduct a full and complete investigation and studv of
personnel of such Department, and scientific research in supcort of the
armed services, considered and agreed to 9 February 1361 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1961 },

"Fourth Service of Supply" as a symbol synonomous with centralization
and with this de%rice the position of this managerial concept for




THE "FOURTH SERVICE"--WHAT IS IT?
A "rose is a rose is a rose is a rose" and "that which we call a
rose by any other name would snoll as sweet. Perhaps, the "Fourth
Service" concept can he considered in this same light for definitively
speaking it means all things to all people and is probably one of the
more vddely expressed yet grossly misunderstood concepts used in the
military today* As indicated in the previous chapter, the "Fourth Serv-
ice" concept does not necessarily have to pertain specifically to a
separate military department or agency with a separate uniformed or
civilian staff but can be used broadly, as in this paper, to encompass
all facets of supply administration under the direct centralized control
of the Department of Defense,
The "Fourth Service" Alternatives
The variations of the "Fourth Service" concept are multitudinous
and can be well illustrated by broad descriptive patterns which stress
alternatives that can be combined to cover practically all of the ideas
which have been proposed and discussed. The data in this section has
been gleaned from conversations with Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U, S,
Navy, Retired, and many other individuals who have given considerable
thought to this area. Here are the definitive alternatives:
Gertrude Stein, "Sacred Emily," in John Bartlett, Familiar
Quotations, edited by Christopher J-brley (Boston: Little, Brown"
and Company, 1948), p, 863,
2
William Shakespeare, Borneo and Juliet, Act II, Scene 2, Line 43,
in John Eartlett, Familiar Rotations, edited by Christopher Llorley
(Boston: Little, Brown and Ccaapany, 1948), v. 78,

Alternatives A«
The "Fourth Service of Supply"— a single, fully integrated
service of supply which provides:
1* Complete logistic support to all branches of the
armed forces at all levels, OH
2«, Complete supply support down to the major depot
level, OR
3. Complete procurement of all supply, OR
4. Complete procurement of all common use items of
supply.
Alternatives B.
The "Fourth Service of Supply" would be staffed and operated
hy:
1. Military personnel, OR
2. Civilian personnel, OR
3. Civilian personnel at producer level and military at
operational or consumer level, OR
4. Civilian and military personnel at producer level and
military at operational or consumer level.
Alternatives C.
The "Fourth Service of Supply" would function under:
1« A fully merged or consolidated Department of Defense,
OR
2 # A Department of Defense with an Army, ITavy, and Air
Force generally similar to the present military
organization, OR
3 # A governmental department, administration, or agency
other than the Department of Defense.
Alternatives D.
The "Fourth Service of Supply" would be:
1. A separate and distinct military department under the
Secretary of Defense, OR
2. A centralized supply agency under the Department of

Defense—a hybrid "Fourth Service" with personnel
drawn from present.military departments but none-
theless beyond their direct control,
The permutations offered by the varying combinations of these
alternatives have offered proponents of a more economical, efficient,
and effective supply program for the armed forces a literal field day
in the area of organization conjecture* Many of the combinations have
been given serious consideration as will be shown subsequently in this
paper.
The Supply Items for "Fourth Servico" Control.
Throughout the history of the discussions over the erctent to
which there should be a merging of the military systems, there has been
confusion as to the items end functions which constitute common supply.
It is in the common supply area where it has bean considered by proponents
of a "Fourth Service," or centralized direction and control of supplies
and cervices, wherein economies and efficiencies can be achieved.
The meaning and magnitude of this common supply area was emphasized
in a 1958 defense study project. This study pointed out:
Of the 3.3 million items -which have been identified under the
Federal Catalog System, the number which can be included within
the term "common supply" vary from 14 to 52 percent. A recent
analysis of the catalog. on an item-by- item basis reveals that
only 14 percent (447,500 stock numbers) are actually identical
in two or more services.
2
InExcerpts from Integrating the Management of Commercial and Common
Items of Supply," Summary of Survey Team Reports on Phase 1 Studies and
Group Recommendations Thereon for Consideration of The Policy Board,
Appendix D, Logistics Systems Study Project (Documents), 1 February 1958,
in United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, Solitary Operations Subcommittee, Military Supply Manage-
Pent (Single Manager Agencies), hearings before Subcommittee, 86th
Congress, 1st Session 25-2S May 1959 (Washington: Government Printing





In 1957 a Department of Defense study divided military materiel
into three major categories: commercial (off-the-shelf) items, non-
? 3
commercial common items, and items peculiar to each of the four mili-
tary services. This study revealed that the total of these three cate-
gories in the "wholesale stocks of services totalled $36,423 million in
the Continental United States and overseas, A further indication of the
magnitude of this area is borne out by the following:
4. The magnitude of materiel in the commercial and in the
all-common categories which is required by troops fighting over-
seas in vrartime is seldom appreciated© This can be illustrated
by an analysis of the materiel procured end that shipped overseas
during World "Tar II,
a. It is estimated that during the calender year 1943 the
Army procured for itself, the Army Air Force and the Marines
approximately $20.1 billion (1943 dollars) worth of materiel
common to t-.vo or more services - 87 percent of its total procure-
ment (deliveries) in that year. Approximately §6.3 billion of
this, or 27 percent was of the "commercial" type as defined herein,
b. Daring calendar year 1943 approximately 27 million measure-
ment tons of "Army" cargo was shipped overseas, and during 1944
this rose to approximately 48 million measurement tons. It is
estimated that 90 percent of all "Army" cargo was shipped to the
European theatre during World Vfar II was within the "common"
1Department of. Defense, "The Evaluation of Concepts for the
Integration of the Military Supply Systems," Volume 1, Team 4, DdD
Logistics Systems Study Project, 12 December 1957, p. 10. (l.ultilithed. )
Commercial (off-the-shelf) items are defined as "those items required .
by the military services, which are generally used throughout the
civilian economy and available through normal commercial distribution
channels (frequently referred to as » off-the-shelf 1 items)."
2 - -
Ibid. Hon- commercial common items are defined as "those items of
materiel used by two or more military services, which are not 'commercial'
as defined above."
Ibid. Peculiar items of materiel are defined as "those items
peculiar to one military service, except for items of similar manufacture
or fabrication which may vary between services as to final color or
c~~z~e (such as vehicles or clothin-)."
12

category and 74 percent of the total was "commercial" type©
*
Using the broader definitions of what constitutes "common supply,"
the 14 percent commonality in two or more services is increased, The
following is germane:
The Hoover Commission used the term "commercial type" items*
If this term is defined to include items generally used tlmrough-
out the civilian economy and available through normal distribution
channels, it is found that 20 percent, rather than 14 percent, of
the items may be eligible for integrated management^
A still broader definition can be chosen to cover 52 percent
of the items by including all those of similar manufacture or
fabrication, both commercial and military in character, which
differ among the services in respects such as color, finish,
markings etc. Under this definition, some combat items would bs
included which past studies have not recommended for integrated
management.3
In its report to the Congress recommending establishment of a
separate civilian-managed agency to administer common supply and service
activities, the Hoover Commission in 1955 has this to say about a cri-
teria for selecting common supply items and service for transfer to a
separate agency:
Materiel procured by the military departments is divided into
tvro broad classifications:
"•Department of Defense, "The Evaluation of Concepts for the
Integration of the %litary Supply Systems," Volume 1, Team 4, DoD
Logistics Systems Study Project, 12 December 1957, p. 12. (Multilithed.)
"Excerpts from Integrating the Management of Commercial and Common
Items of Supply," Summary of Survey Team Reports on Phase 1 Studies and
Steering Group Recommendations Thereon for Consideration of the Policy
Board, Appendix D, Logistics Systems Study Project (Documents), 1
February 1958, in United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee,
Military Supnly Management (Single Manager Agencies), hearings before
subcommittee, 36th Congress, 1st Session, 25-26 May 1959 (Washington:




Military hard poods wJdch comprise the weapons of war: air-
craft, ships, tanhs7~guns, ammunition, spares, components end
other military-type items. Expenditures for this classification
of items in the fiscal year 1955 are estimated to be $12,500,000,000
or more than 75 percent of total DoD procurement expenditures.
Commercial-type items commonly used among the departments and
readily found in the civilian economy. Examples are food, clothing,
medical and dental supplies, fuels and lubricants, hardware, house-
hold-and-office-type supplies and equipment, commercial automobiles,
and vehicular spare parts. Expenditures for this classification
of items in the fiscal year 1955 are estimated at $4,000,000,000,
A separate agency v/ould be expected to assume supply responsi-
bilities for commercial-type items and services. J-
In regard to the above discussion, it is interesting to note that
the selection of items for centralized management in the single managers
today in 1961 is still causing the armed forces difficulties. The job
of segregating and segmenting the item inventory is a continuing one
and will be so for a long time in the future, The Report on Management
of Electrical/SLectronics Materiel of February, 1961, emphasizes this
fact in its discussion of the 1,500,000 items projected to be under
centralized, merged, or single-manager-type system of inventory control.
To achieve integrated management for these 1,500,000 items
during the next three years, approximately 1,900,000 items in
242 Federal Supply Classes will have been individually analyzed
by the military services and responsibility for their logistic
support determined and implemented. Thus, the scope of integrated
management will expand fifteen-fold from the present range of less
than 100,000 items* to 1,500,000 items,2
The Function s Involved
Just as the basic concepts and items for centralized control have
1 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Busines s Organisation of the Department of Defens e, A Report to the
Congress ('."ashingten: Government Printing Office, June, 1955), pp. 45-46.
2
Armed Fore is Supply Support Center, "Report on Management of
Electrical/Electronics Materiel, " Volume I, Conclusions, Recommendations,
and Impact, February, 1961, o, 182, (Multilithed.)
i<i

been the subject for much written discussion and controversy over which
should constitute, broadly speaking, a "Fourth Service of Supply," like-
wise have there been confusion, misunderstandings, and changes in con-
cepts "oy interested groups in the functions which such an organization
should administer. This lack of agreement relative to functions that
are susceptible to integration or central direction was indicated to the
Congress in 1959* In this regard, a report stated:
« • ©the supply cycle, starting with the statement of the gross
requirement by the military planning authorities, through the
successive steps of determining the net requirement to procure
(based on subtracting the assets from the gross requirement),
making the contract with industry, positioning the materiel in
storage depots, and finally distributing the materiel to the
user, historically, the easiest of these functions to integrate
has been that of contracting. The single manager arrengement
includes the entire supply control function (net requirements
computation and distribution direction). However, the planning
of gross requirements, depot administration, and the custody
and use of assets at consur.-ier level have not been considered as
responsibilities which can be separated from the management of
the individual military services. -*-
In addition to supoly functions considered for a centrally
administered agency by proponents of a "Fourth Service," many proposals
have included administration of common services such as general and
specialized hospitals. Tlhile the Second Hoover Commission made a strong
proposal in the services functional area, it did not precisely define
what it meant. In this respect, the Commission wrote in 1955 concerning
its recommended central agency to administer supplies and services:
"Excerpts from Integrating the Management of Commercial and Common
Items of Supply," Summary of Survey Team Reports on Phase 1 Studies and
Steering Group Recommendations Thereon for Consideration of the Policy
Board, Appendix D, Logistics Systems Study Project (Documents), 1 February
1958, in United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Government Opero.tions, Military Operations Subcommittee, Military Supply
Ifenagement (Single Manager Agencies), hearings before Subcommittee, 86tk
Congress, 1st Session, 25-25 May 1959 (TTashin^ton : Government Printing
Office, 1959), p. 527.

It is important that well- defined guides be established which
will prevent the separate agency from performing any but service
functions or assuming responsibilities which would impair the
carrying out of each department's combat mission. In fact, it
•would be desirable for Congress to specify criteria which will
preserve the service and supporting role visualised by the com-
mittee. The committee, therefore, recommends:
Recommendation No. 9. The legislation establishing the sepa-
rate supply and service agency should specify criteria which will
assure a strict supporting role for the agency.
The following four criteria are recommended:
(a) Requirements always must flow from the military departments
under policies established and reviews conducted by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, For example, requirements for food stem
basically from (l) the number of people to be fed; (z) the deploy-
ment of these people, and (3) the standard of feeding. Hone of
these determinations should be made by the service agency, but by
the individual departments in accordance with policies of the
Secretary of Defense.
(b) Specifications for technical items also must flow from the
customers to the service agency. For example, professional medical
personnel should decide upon specifications for medical supplies
and equipment under Office of Secretary of Defense policy.
(c) A buyer-seller relationship should be established. Each
buyer department should continue to request and justify the funds
required for its total needs so that it actually buys supplies
and services from the separate agency, which should be financed
through a stock fund.
(d) The commodities and services placed in a separate agency
should be of a commercial-type commonly used in the civilian
economy.
1
The data noted above in the excerpts from the Second Hoover
Commission are included herein to illustrate the difficulties to define
the "Fourth Service of Supply" concept in any significant detail.. The
alternatives indicated in the first part of this chapter have many combina-
tions, many of which have been intensely studied by the armed forces.
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Basin ?ss Organization of the Department of Defense, A Report to
Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, June, 1955), pp. 45-47,
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The area of it era control for central management is even today being
intensely reviewed by the Department of Defense and vail be a continuing
managerial problem for defense decision-makers. In the functional area,
many differences of opinion exist, however, as with most proposals of
this nature, the concept is more emphasized than are the details and
opponents have developed elaborate simulations to contradict the benefits
promised,
T/hile the "Fourth Service" as a separate military department may
not be near establishment, its possibility exists as a spectre hovering
over all supply and services arrangements in the Department of Defense
today. The proponents for and the arguments against -trill be stressed in




THE POLITICAL PRESSURES FOR
The political interests in more economical and efficient supply
management long predate the great concern manifested in the unification
of the armed forces after ;7orld Y«rar II. "Though supply activities com-
prise the largest part of the defense budget and offer the largest
possible sirgle activity where economy and efficiency and effectiveness
may be achieved, there are many service activities which are overlapping
and duplicative," so expressed a Congressional Committee in 1960 and in
so doing made repetitious Congressional criticism that ranges back to
World T/ar I and beyond. Because of this and other criticism, there has
evolved political pressure from the Congress, from private groups, and
at tines from within the armed forces themselves for a central, consoli-
dated agency which would more economically, more efficiently, and more
effectively provide supply support and common services to the military
organization* The "Fourth Service of Supply" as a concept for central-
ized direction of this area is not a nevr one.
The antecedents of the current proposal that there should be
a Fourth Service of Supply e:ctend through at least the past 35
years.
During the quarter century between the passage of the
national Defense Act of 1920 and that of the national Security
Act of 1947, some 60 Congressional committees held hearings
end consequently proposed legislation purporting to consolidate
either the armed services themselves or one or more of
their logistical functions* Featured in almost every one of
"united States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement, Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and
Supply, repor! s bcommittee^ 86th Gongressj 2d Session (Tfeshington:
Gover". 'fice, I960), p. 77.
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these proposed "bills was the consolidation of the military pro-
curement function,^-
Early Pressures for A Ministry of_ Supply/Munitions
A 1955 Army report points out that "as far back as World War I,
the proposal for a single Hanistry of Supply' has been successively
studied and successively rejected* Hr, Baruch was urgod to create a
2
centralized procurement agency for military supplies in Tib rid War I*
Adherents of centralized supply control have long exerted pressure for
a consolidated effort in this area and herein their thoughts will be pur-
sued.
Interest in a "Fourth Service," or a ministry of munitions as it
was then called, manifested itself prominently on the Congressional
scene at the beginning of TTorld^TTar II. An important 1945 report had
this to say about this early consideration:
Shortly after the attack on Pearl Earbor and the declaration
of war on Japan and Germany, plans for a "Ministry of Munitions"
to be charged vdth procurement for all of the war agencies were
seriously considered. The Tolan Committee on Migratory Labor,
of the Pbuse of Representatives, in December 1941 and in 1942
sponsored legislation for the creation of a single civilian agency
to control all civilian and war production: the Senate Educa-
tional Committee in 1942 held hearings, and reported favorably,
upon a similar proposal*
This matter continued to agitate the Congress in early 1943,
The.Kilgore bill (S. 607, 78th Congress), largely based on the
earlier bills ( H, R. 7742 and S. 2871, 77th Congress), was dis-
cussed at some length upon the Senate floor and by several com-
mittees. The Kilgore bill proposed an Office of Yfer Mobilization
and as a part thereof an Office of Production and Supply, with
Frank A* Osmanski, Colonel, ,TA Fourth Service of Supply?" Military
Review, U. S, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, June, 1953, p. 12,
2Department of the Amy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics, "The Fourth Service of Supply and Alternatives," 26 September
1955, p. 31. (l.rultilithed.)
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complete authority over war procurement. The War and Navy Depart-
ments opposed this measure as fundamentally unsound in that it
removed from the responsible military leaders control of procure-
ment of the weapons and munitions to wage vmr. The bill was dis-
carded upon establishment of the Office of War Mobilization by
Executive Order No. 9347, but reverberations of the concept of a
Ministry of Supply were heard thereafter from time to time on the
*/ XT ST v -
floors of the Congress. 1
Woodran Committee Hearings
The next milestone in the pressures for a "Fourth Service of Supply"
came in 1944 during the Y/bodrun committee hearings. Y/hile the hearings
were basically concerned with post-war military policy and the proposal
to establish a single department of armed forces, considerable discussion
was devoted to establishment of a separate supply organization. Lieutenant
General Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army,
had this to say:
I would add to the three armed services which are united in
this single department, a fourth element, directly under the
Secretary for the Armed Forces, which would consist of the common
supply services that can be combined and which could render
supply services which are not peculiar to any one service.^
In support of a director of common supplies and services, General
Brehon B. Sonmervell, Commanding General of the Army Service Forces,
before the Y/bodrun Committee had this to say:
We cannot have an efficient, streamlined, economical organiza-
tion of a single department of war if each of the three major
combat commands within that department, air, ground, and sea, set
up their own self-contained systems for administration, service,
"""United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement, Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and
Supply, report of subcommittee, 86th Congress, 2d Session (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 109-110.
'United States Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee
on Post-War Policy, Proposal to Establish a Single Department of .Armed
Fo_rces, hearings before (v.bodrum) committee, Ttth Congress, 2d Session,
Fart 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 34.
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and supply. Such, an approach, in practical application, would
only mean the drawing together of three separate departments
under a superdepartmental secretary. We would still have three
supply officers buying and distributing shoes; • . • The real
integration would come about through the establishment of a
Common service force within a single department of war which would
supply and service the three combatant forces on equal terms©
This would result in one purchasing agent for shoes, and one
system of distributing and issuing those shoes,-'-
Hoover Commission Pepo rt s of 1949
Another significant milestone in the pressures for more efficient,
effective, and economical operations of the military supply function was
the Hoover Commission reports of 1949. While the National Security Act
of 1947 resulted in the Munitions Board being made the central coordinating
agency for supply policies in the National Military Establishment, the
1949 Hoover Commission recommended that "its charter be .further expanded
2
to cover all phases of supply." More specifically, the Commission
pointed the way for a Department of Supply to evolve out of the Munitions
Board by writing the following:
We recommend that the powers and functions of the Munitions
Board be more clearly defined, in language which is unmistakable.
To insure that result, we suggest that the National Security Act
of 1947 be amended to empower the Secretary of Defense to delegate
to the Munitions Board the necessary broad authority, not only to
coordinate, but also to integrate the organizations and procedures
for the various phases of supply in the constituent departments
of the National Military Establishment* It should also be
authorised to recommend a workable plan for the consolidation of
the Marine Corps supply system with that of the Navy; to integrate
the supply operations and organization of the Coast Guard with the
Navy; and to suggest, at the proper time and after supply assign-
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee
on Post-War Policy, Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed
Forces, hearings before (Woo drum) committee, 78th Congress, 2d Session,
Fart 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 98.
2 Commission on 'Organization of the Executive Branch of the C-ovem-
mearb, Task _?orce Report on The Federal Supply System, Appendix B
(Washington: Government Printing office, January, 1949)^ p. 27.
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merits have eliminated current duplication and overlapping, a
Department of Supply for the military services, comparable in
function to the Central Supply Organization now recommended for
the civilian agencies o-*-
The thinking of this First Hoover Commission in reducing duplica-
tions and overlappings in the materiel function within government agencies
is summarized below in the Commission's language. This pertains to its
recommendation for the establishment of a Central Supply Organization
in the Executive Office of the President©
Tie are convinced by our study and investigation, that the
supply problem of the Government is too vast and diversified for
centralization in operations* 77e also are convinced that the
supply problems of the military services are sufficiently diverse
and are so intimately related to national defense, as to justify
separate handling of technical and tactical items. On the other
hand, there is a large range of common-use items which are sus-
ceptible to centralized operation, either for the civilian or for
the military agencies; and, furthermore, in this list of common-
use items there are so many which could and should be handled by
one single organization on a Government-wide basis.
The long-range objective is to reduce to the minimum the
number of separate offices engaged in purchasing; the number of
storehouses, depots or other distributing points; and the number
of employees working at the several phases of supply. A concomitant
long-range objective is the maximum simplification of the costly
and useless paper work which now characterizes supply processes*
The 1949 Hoover Commission made many recommendations concerning
supply both for the defense and non-defense federal agencies. The Task
Force on The Federal Supply System reported that great savings would be
realized if its recommendations were adopted. The below-noted para-
graph is similar to many statements made then and since then on potential,
large savings in the supply management field in the federal government
in general and in the Department of Defense in particular.
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Task Force gaport on The Federal Supply System, Appendix B (Trash-





The task force also estimates that it should be possible to
reduce stores inventories, both military and civilian, by over
2,500 'million dollars. This would permit a cut in personnel
engaged in stores activities. The adoption of the recommendations
relating to traffic management would produce additional savings,
Adoption of the recommendations relating to inspection, specifica-
tion, property identification, and property utilization would also
achieve appreciable savings in personnel and operating costs.
*
The Hoover Commission Report of 1949 was the forerunner of a flood
of studies and proposals by the Congress to improve supply management in
the Department of Defense and the pressures for centralized direction
were more aggressively applied as time passed. The Bonner subcommittee
of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department held
extensive hearings on military supply management in the United States
and around the world. In June of 1952, Chairman Bonner introduced a
bill, H. R. 8130, to accomplish abjectives which if successfully adopted
could have brought the "Fourth Service of Supply" into early being. His
bill was designed to accomplish thsse objectives:
1. Set up an Under Secretary of Defense for Supply
2. Abolish the impotent Inanitions Board
3. Transfer to the Secretary of Defense control over supply
matters now vested in many boards, individuals, etc.
4. Create an efficient and well-trained supply corps to assist
the Under Secretary to perform his duties.
5. Give the Under Secretary proper control over appropriations.
1 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, The Hoover Commission Report (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 1949), p. 105.
~~
2United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement, Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and
Supjply, report of subcommittee, 86th Congress, 2d Session (Washington;
Government Printing. Office, I960), pp. 53-55.

President Ei senhower's "Famine or Feast" Speech
Another milestone that kept the pressure high for economy and
efficiency in the supply and services areas of the Department of Defense
was President Eisenhower's "Famine or Feast" defense policy speech in
Baltimore, Maryland, on 25 September 1952. Mr, Eisenhower then said:
The real problem is to baild this defense with wisdom and
efficiency. We must achieve both security and solvency. In
fact, the foundation of military strength is economic strength,
A bankrupt America is more the Soviet goal than an America
conquered on the field of battle, , ©
We have never been a military-minded people. In time of peace,
we have always cut the Military Establishment to the bone, then
to the marrow* In time of war, we have said, "Let the profes-
sional soldier take care of it," This attitude. has encouraged
the military, accustomed to famine or feast, to try to take ad-
vantage of crisis.
Resulting frenzied expansion has meant disorder, duplication,
and waste. It has meant an attempt, for example, by our Air Force
to buy 20,000 supordeluxe desk chairs at $10 above the standard
model price. It has meant our Navy laying in a 50-year supply
of anchors all at once. It has meant our Army buying enough
front-axle gaskets for jeeps to last one full century.
This pattern has been bad enough in the past. In today* s world
of continuing tension, it is intolerable. For we no longer he.ve
clear, precise lines between a time of peace and a time of war.
We have to live and vrork and plan in a twilight zone between the
two. Complexity creates confusion everywhere. Generals who used
to be trained to concentrate on military decisions feel compelled
to consider economic factors,
• • ,With three services, in place of the former two, still
going their separate ways and with an overall civilian staff
frequently unable to enforce corrective action, the end result has
been not to renove duplication bat to produce triplication, ^-
The O'Mahoney Amendment
It must not be presumed in reading this chronology of the pressures
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement, Sconomi
c
Aspects of Military Procurement and
fopply j report of subcommittee, 86th Congress, 2d Session (Washington:
Government Printing Office, I960), pp. 115-117.

for centralization that there was no activity within the Department of
Defense to effect improved supply management. Subsequent chapters will
delineate some of this activity; however, the efforts of the defense
organization did not satisfy the criticisms of inefficiency by the Con-
gress and the pressures were continued. The O'Mahoney Amendment to the
DoD Appropriation Bill In 1953 was another milestone in attempts by the
Congress to strengthen the central management of the Department of De-
fense, While not specifically advocating a "Fourth Service of Supply,"
it did place definitive restrictions upon the Department of Defense and
forced the centralization concept to nove at a faster pace. Senator
O'Mahoney, then chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, placed this
language into law:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and for the
purpose of achieving an efficient, economical, and practical
operation of an integrated supply system designed to meet
the needs of the military departments without duplicating or
overlapping of either operations or functions, no officer or
agency in or under the Department of Defense, after the effective
date of this section, shall obligate any funds for procurement,
production, warehousing, distribution of supplies or equipment
or related supply management functions, except in accordance with
regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense,
(b) This section shall be effective 60 days after the approval
of this act,-
This amendment could easily have resulted in a "Fourth Service of
Supply" for its unquestionably placed authority in the hands of the
Secretary of Defense for uniform materiel management. While such .a
"Fourth Service" per se did not materialize, the amendment did result
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement, Economic Aspe cts of Military Procurement and
Supply, report of subcommittee, 86th Congress, 2d Session (".Yashington:
Government Printing Office, I960), r». 64.
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in more integrated materiel management in the Department of Defense,
It is interesting that the full intent of the amendment was identified
in a Senate Report of 1952 and this certainly made the amendment an
important milestone along the rocky road being built for defense materiel
management. One of the essential parts of the report stated:
Under the new system, it should be impossible for two com-
peting facilities to be set up (or to continue to e;cist) in the
same area for the Same purpose as determined by the Secretary of
Defense. Service facilities for maintenance of equipment such as
motor shops, laundries, etc©, should be integrated to serve all
departmental requirements in the area. Special attention should
be given to the procurement, production, distribution, warehousing,
maintenance, and issue of common-use items such as clothing, food,
medical supplies, and building materials, to minimize stocks,
handling, transportation, and related supply management activities.
Wherever possible such items and the method of handling them will
be made uniform throughout the Department of Defense to facilitate
such integration. Where different stock levels exist in various
parts of the Department,* it is expected that the lowest level will
be applied to the whole Department in the absence of a compelling
justification for special treatment, which justification will be
made to the appropriate committees of Congress,-*
The pressures continued and "on February 17, 1953, the Sarnoff
Commission issued a report pointing out the need for economies in the
supply and service activities of the defense agencies. This was fol-
lowed by the report of the Rockefeller committee on April 11, 1953, which
laid the foundation for the Reorganization Plan No, 6."2 Into this cli-
mate in 1955 burst the Second Hoover Commission Report,
Hoover Commission Report of 1955
Perhaps no greater impetus has been given to the "Fourth Service"
united States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement, Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and
Supply, report of subcommittee, 06th Congress, 2d Session (Washington;




concept than that provided by the Second Hoover Commission in 1955
which among other things openly and directly recommended that "Congress
should enact legislation establishing a separate civilian-managed agency,
reporting to the Secretary of Defense, to administer common supply and
service activities.*1 In this respect, the Hoover Commission went on to
recommend that "The separate agency should be named the 'Defense Supply
and Service Administration,' and its Administrator should be a presi-
dential appointment. Initially, the agency should manage selected items
2
of common supply and operate general end specialized hospitals.
The Hoover Commission's recommendations were not supported with
a detailed organizational and functional blueprint showing precisely how
the proposed agency -would operate. This caused considerable misunder-
standings in some quarters and left unanswered a host of important
questions, Commissioner Chet liolifield approved the report with this,
among other qualifications, concerning the lack of clarity in some of
the proposed organizational relationships of such an agency:
Had the Commission on Business Organization analyzed in detail
the role of the proposed new agency and more carefully defined
its place in the military establishment, I believe that it would
have a better chance of acceptance. It is well to understand that
the proposal will encounter active opposition in some quarters
and, if adopted, could be reduced to ineffectiveness by hard core
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Business Organization of the Department of Defense , A Report to the
Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, June, 1955), p, 45,
Ibid,, p, 50,
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement, Background Material on Economic Aspects of
Military Procurement and supply, 36th Congress~2d Session (Vfashin'gt on
:
Government Printing Office, Xs February I960), p, 76,
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military resistance and failure of the Secretary of Defense
to give the agency strong support.!
The proposal for a Defense Supply and Service Administration pro- .
voked voluminous and voluble analytical comment both within and outside
the Department of Defense. It represents another in the many historical
milestones erected by political pressure groups to improve defense sup-
ply management. Whether adopted or not these milestonos have ultimately
had a terrific impact on the defense supply. organization by causing more
and more centralised direction and control,
The T.IcComack-Curtis Amendment
The pressures have been continuous and unrelenting. The 1958
Department of Defense Reorganization Act included the Mc Comack- Curtis
amendment which "removed any possible doubt as to the authority of the
Secretary of Defense to integrate supply and service functions when it
would be in the best interests of the Government. n The amendment served
further notice of the intent of the Congress that positive and continued
action be taken by the Secretary of Defense to eliminate duplication and
waste in military supply and service programs and to develop ways to
bring about efficient performance in this area. The amendment reads:
TThenever the Secretary of Defense determines it will be
advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness,
economy, or efficiency, he shall provide for the carrying out
of any supply or service activity common to more than one
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment, Business Organization of the Department of Defense, A Peport to the
Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, June, 1955), p. 121.
2
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on
Defense Procurement, Genomic Aspects of T.'llitary Procurement and Supply,
report cf sul ;ommitteej 86th Congress, 2d Session '(Washington: Gove rn-
"
cent Printing Office, 1950), p 72.
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military department by a single agency or such other organiza-
tional entities as he deems appropriate. For the purposes of
this paragraph, any supply or service activity common to more
than one military department shall not be considered a "major
combatant function" within the meaning of paragraph (l) hereof.
House Majority Leader McCormack has carefully explained the intent
and scope of the amendment he introduced. He points out that his amend-
ment can become a most important piece of legislation as it has been
estimated that up to 60 percent of the annual DoD appropriation is for
supply and service activities. One of the most important aspects of the
amendment is that it definitely removes supply and service activities
common to two or more departments from being categorized as "major
combatant functions" and hence subject to veto action by the military
departments. "So for the first time the Congress has given to the
Secretary of Defense specific authority to organize and operate common
supply and service activities without being subject to compromise or
a veto by separately administered departments autonomous in all functions
whether or not directly or remotely related to combatant functions."2
The Douglas Report of I960
The General Accounting Office has been no small contributor to
the Congressional pressures noted herein. Reports to the Congress by
the Comptroller General of the United States have fed the flames keeping
hot the steam boilers. Pressures have been more and more built up. In
1960, the Douglas Report stated that "a review of the numerous reports
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Defense Procurement, Economic Aspects of Military Pro curement and
Supply
, report of subcommittee, 86th Congress, 2d Session (Washington;




concerning supply and procurement issued by the General Accounting
Office within the past few years shows clearly that the actions taken
by the Department of Defense and the military departments to improve
supply operations are, at best, only half measures. " This same report
rapped the single manager plans "which have been established to integrate
materiel management at the defense level. This is what the Douglas re-
port had to say:
Cooperation, coordination, collaboration, etc,, etc., are very
necessary and desirable but are not substitutes for solid organisa-
tion, ^hey should not continue to be used as Fabian tactics to
frustrate proper unified orgcnization.
The idea of a consolidrted supply agency at the Office of
the Secretary of Defense level, with an elite personnel, was
recommended by the Bonner Committee and the Joint Economic Com-
mittee members in 1952 and the second Hoover Commission in 1955.
The single manager plans have been the best of the arrangements
as they provide more integration, but they are still wanting in
many respects. The managers serve in double roles as department
and Department of Defense representatives and no one can serve two
masters who have different objectives. There is lack of the super-
vision, direction, and control needed to standardize items and
streamline operations. There are too many councils, departments,
and services who can delay, frustrate, or veto.
There have been many studies and feasibility tests of the
obvious—that one service can efficiently buy, store, distribute,
and otherwise manage common supplies for all. This principle of
supply management does not need further testing. It needs wide
application.
The time has come to consolidate these and other common operations
into a consolidated system such as the Uavy found necessary for its
eight bureaus many years ago and the Army during the stress of war
and as advocated by the Hoover Commission and many others.
^
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on
Defense Procurement, Economic Aspects of Military Pro curement and Suoplv,
report of subcommittee, 86th Congress, 2d Session (."Washington : Government




The Douglas report is current. It is a part of what appears to
"be a perpetual attack upon the materiel management of the Department of
Defense and, if it is not perpetual, then certainly this review of the
history of these attacks make perpetuity mere of a reality than mere
possibility, Nevertheless, this Douglas report vigorously called for a
consolidated common supply agency within the Department of Defense to
be staffed with a highly trained, well-paid corps of e:q>erts and respon-
sible to the Secretary of Defense. Here is the basic recommendation:
The Secretary of Defense should use his broad authority,
especially under the O'Mahoney and McCormack- Curtis amendments,
at once to begin consolidating the many common supply activities
in the Department of Defense (DoD) into a common agency operating
at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level*
The consolidated agency should be staffed with a highly trained,
well-paid DoD corps of e:qserts drawn from the e:cisting services,
industry, and Government and responsible to the Secretary of De-
fense,
The consolidated agency, assisted by necessary advisory groups,
should hare control of all facets of common supply management from
requirements determination through procurement, transportation,
storage, issuance (utilization), and surplus disposal.
It should have authority over cataloging and standardization of
specifications.
It should be given control over common supply funds.
The Douglas Report has some startling estimates about possible
economies in a properly organized DoD logistics system. Here is the key
paragraph on this subject in the report*
A reasonable estimate of possible economy in a properly
organized DoD logistics system is 10 percent of procurement, or
from ^2 to 2v billion annually, and at least 10 percent in the
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on
Defense Procu -
_. Economic Asp -vjts of Military Pro curement and Supply,
report of rtoe, oO-ch *Co-"grecs, 2d Session (Washington* Govern-
ment Printing Office, I960), pp, xi-xii«
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management of the supply systems which now cost an estimated §2
billion. A utilization program with real teeth would produce
economies which would run into hundreds of millions of dollars
annually. An effective standardization program would create
savings of at least 3450 million annually. The possibilities of
economies through better procurement, transportation, and disposal
are incalculable.
-
This very direct concern of the Congress in defense materiel
management is a continuing one and the concern is expressed by a vri.de
variety of Congressional committees in the House and Senate. House
Resolution 78 authorizes the "Committee on Armed Services to conduct a
full and complete investigation and study of all matters relating to
procurement by the Department of Defense, personnel of such Department,
laws administered by such Department, use of funds by such Department,
and scientific research in support of the armed services." This resolu-
tion was introduced 4 January 1961 and was considered and agreed to by
the House on 9 February 1931. This committee, chaired by Mr« Carl
Vinson, will certainly look into defense materiel management and organi-
zation and will plow the terrain again in search of an effective, econom-
ical, and efficient defense supply organisation.
Among the other committees in the current Congress interested in
military supply management is the House Committee on Government Operations,
The concluding statement in a 1960 report of this committee projected its
thinking relative to the supply organization ten years hence to 1970*
Tae Committee wrote: .
7Te believe the Department of Defense would be '.veil advised to
undertake a serious study of its future organization and of the
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on
Defense Procurement, Sconomic Aspects of Military Procurement and SuodIv,
report of subcommittee, SSth Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1960), pp. viii-ix.
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appropriate logistics arrangements. • .the Armed Forces Supply
Suoport Center should be concerned not only with evolving detailed
supply management problems but with formulating an optimum supply
organization for the military establishment of 1970, l
As can be easily ascertained from the data in this chapter, and
there is much more along the same lines, the Congress is aroused and has
been aroused for a long tine over military materiel management. While
the "Fourth Service" as a separate uniformed or civilian managed organi-
zation has not always been specifically mentioned, sufficient interest
has been generated on the consolidation and centralization of the supply
function very definitely to indicate that a "Fourth Service," literally
or figuratively, is the Congressional goal and through it economies and
efficiencies are expected to materialize.
Nov/- let*s look at what the Defense Department has to say about
these Congressional efforts* TJhat has DoD been doing to counter the
charges of overlapping and duplication in the military supply and service
systems? The ne:ct chapter covers the defense position against the "Fourth
Service" concept.
United States Congress, House of .Representatives, Committee on
Government Lons, ::ilitg.ry Su
:




ath report oy oomaitte
, 36th Congress, 2d Session
[Washington: Government Printing Office, i960), p. 33.

CHAPTER XV
THE DEFENSE POSITIONS AGAINST
The Department of Defense lias countered the pressures from the
Congress for a single agency administering supplies and services with
materiel management programs aimed at improving, within a frame developed
by the armed forces, military logistics, As the Congress became more
aggressively interested in the supply field, the Department of Defense
more intensively emphasised programs to improve supply management, re-
leased significant directives covering various facets of materiel manage-
ment, and initiated nerr supply programs for more effective, efficient,
and economical operations. In none of these endeavors did the Depart-
ment of Defense overtly accept a CDncept that military supplies and
services should "be administered by a separate agency in or outside the
department.
Early Arguments
The defense position against a "Fourth Service of Supply" in all
of its broad considerations developed very early after 7/brld Tfar II and
a consolidation has been vigorously resisted in this area. It is
interesting to look at some of the early replies to the 1944 recommenda-
tion for a director of common supplies and services which "was proposed
by Lieutenant General McNarney before the TToodrum Committee. In a speech
on "Economy of Procurement Under a Single Secretary, " Mr. H. Struve
Hensel, Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1945, voiced opposition to
i
the consolidation in the procurement field. lie said:
When I first came to the :Tavy in 1940, centralised purchasing
for both Army and Navy by a separate organization rras a live topic.
iaany people favored the establishment of a civilian Ministry of"
Supply apart from the two services to accomplish that end. S» ?092
(77th Congress) with provisions as to that effect was actually

introduced. The proponents of such measures claimed billions of
dollars of savings. The secret was said to be single control
made effective through a staff of efficient civilians trained in
business methods and procedures. It was said that purchasing
was a civilian skill and could not be satisfactorily performed
in an armed service.
Such clamor was not ended until President Roosevelt issued
Executive Order No. 9024 conferring on the War Production Board
the power to create within itself a single procurement agency for
hoth~ the War and Navy Departments. Such power was ne^rov exercised.
The War Production Board" acted as if it cane to the conclusion
that, under all the. circumstances, greater economy and speed
could be attained by keeping procurement decentralized in the
services. Experts were assigned by the Board to the War and Navy
Departments to supervise procurement. Those experts became a
part of the War and Navy Departments, At that tine both the Army
and ilavy agreed that such method—rather than centralisation— was
the proper way to efficiency and economy in dollars, time and
manpower.!
Ur. Kensel stated that he approached with skepticism the assertion
that a single procurement agensy would have done a better job end saved
billions of dollars during Yforld War II. He said he was more than
skeptical and that:
I do not think a single secretary will cure our procurement
troubles. On the other hand, I think that our present inefficien-
cies and gaps may well be aggravated by consolidating the procure-
ment agencies of the two departments into one so large that no
man could hope to encompass within his control, memory or imagina-
tion all of its purchasing functions or aspects. It is my opinion
that many of our problems can be solved by retaining separate
.procurement agencies and by an entirely different approach as to
policy control. It is my further belief that this conclusion is
completely supported by a study of our procurement experience to
date and an analysis of the essential elements of good procure-
ment, I am also hopeful that, even if you do not agree with me,
you will concede that clear and substantial proof as to economies
and efficiency roust be offered by the proponents of a single
Secretary,^
The 1945 arguments brought from Fletcher Pratt the strong statement
H. Struve Hens el, "Economy of Procurement Under a Single
Secretary," 1945, pp. 5A-6.fi. (J&moographad*)
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that "procurement cannot be combined." He cites this case history in
connection with the French:
V/hen one gets up to the region where unified procurement might
be expected to effect real economies of money, time, and procedure,
it becomes almost impossible*
The thing has been tried, like so many other details of the
unification procedure, and it has not worked out. At the close
of the last war, the French built a class of light cruisers, the
DUGUAY-TKOUIiTS. It occurred to someone over there what an admirable
idea it would be to arm them with guns of 155 millimeter (6.1 inch)
caliber, chambered to take the shells used by the common heavy gun
of the French Army. It didn't work. The naval 6.1 proved a slow
firer, just a little too heavy to permit the shells to be manhandled
and thus requiring such heavy power machinery in such a heavy turret
that with very little more the guns could have been 8 inches.
The expected economy from using Army ammunition also did not
work out. For shipboard use there is desired either an armor-
piercing shell or one with a thin casing filled with HE, while the
fragmentation shells used by the Army vrere of value only for shore
bombardments. The result -.of this experimentation in amalgamation
was thus to produce a series of cruisers that had to sacrifice
armor in favor of loading machinery, were very weak hitters for
their size, and used guns that required the manufacture of wholly
new types of naval shell ©^
The "Fourth Service" and Alternatives
In 1955 was released one of the more important studies analyzing
possible alternatives in lieu of the civilian-managed supply administra-
tion recommended by the Hoover Commission, Five alternate concepts for
performing military common supply activities within the Continental
United States ( COITUS) were the subject of an Army staff study on "The
Fourth Service of Supply and Alternatives." This is the study that
recommended the single manager system which has centralised designated




^•Fletcher Pratt, "The Case Against Un5.fication," Sea Pfcmer,
mber 1245.

The conclusions to this analysis are significant and are quoted
heroin to illustrate the results and finiteness of the study. The staff
study first looks at the Hoover Commission "Fourth Service/' then at a
General Services Administration concept, a "Military Fourth Service"
concept, a "Single Manager" concept, an "Improvement of Existing Systems"
concept, a "Modified Single Manager" concept, and concludes with emphasis
on the latter two as good plans for the improvement of common supply.
b. Hoover Commission "Fourth Service"
(1) The Defense Supply end Service Administration proposed by
the Hoover Commission would result in duplication of personnel,
increased competition for scarce professional and technical skills,
and reduction in the Army 1 s capability to train logistical managers.
(2) The "Administration" would be unable to expand rapidly in
wartime without access to the draft; and might experience great
difficulty in retaining personnel in wartime, both in COITUS and
overseas, unless very high wages were paid.
(3) In the overseas theater, high wages paid civilian members
of the "Administration" -would hurt soldier morale; troops would
have to be diverted to. provide protection for th^se civilians;
their status when captured would be uncertain; and their inflexi-
bility as to assignment within the Combat Zona, both as individuals
and as units, would limit their usefulness.
c. Alternate plans
(1) The General Services Administration concept. The civilian
character of this organization, which would preclude its rapid ex-
pansion in wartime relative to the military services; the magnitude
of the common supply field; trie mediocre performance record of GSA
to date; and its divided responsibilities within the Government
make this concept undesirable.
(2) The "Military Fourth Service" concept. TJhile overcoming
the personnel deficiencies of the "Civilian Fourth Service" con-
cept, the cost and the disruption which would be incident to its
establishment indicate that, for common supply activities, this
concept is undesirable.
(3) The "Single Manager" concept. This concept would accomplish
a high degree of integration of Service supply functions, but
separates research and development from gross requirements, assigns
distribution missions inefficiently and does not provide the
.' Single Manager with a joint staff.
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(4) The "Improvement of E:dLsting Systems" concept • This con-
cept integrates the purchase function, reduces overbuying by re-
quiring certificates of non-availability from other Departments,
and provides for rearrangement of the depot system and reassign-
ment of customers.
(5) The "Modified Single Manager" concept. This concept would
accomplish a high degree of integration of Service supply functions.
It would virtually assure correction of overbuying by centralized
control, and of uneconomical use of distribution media through
rearrangement of the depot system, reassignment of customers, and
centralised control of distribution.
d. The nature of the deficiency to be corrected (i.e., over-
buying, competition for industrial capacity, or maldistribution),
together with the characteristics of the industry involved, and
the relative requirements of the three Services, influence the
selection of the concept which would be best tc apply in correcting
the deficiencies. Both the "Improvement" concept and the "Modified




Thus in 1955 the single manager program was developed in part as
an alternative to a "Fourth Service of Supply." It was designed specifi-
cally to meet the criticisms of Congress and the Hoover Commission with
respect to duplication, overlapping and waste in procurement, warehousing
and stockage of supplies, and failure to use the resources of all three
military departments to meet the separate requirements of each department.
It was established to Integrate basic supply functions for commercial-
type commodities used in common by two or more military services.
The single manager program is considered a success by the Depart-
ment of Defence and is one of the Department's strongest arguments
against the disruptive influence of a separate "Fourth Service." Mr.
Perkins McGuire, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics),
Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
logistics, "The Fourth Service of Supply and Alternatives," 26 September
1955, pp. 121-125. (Hixltilithed.)

wrote the following in a single manager progress report in November, 1960:
One advantage of this program. * .is that it has brought the
Departments into a very close relationship with each other in
the field of supply. People with common problems in the four
services are now working in unison. At the outset, the Depart-
ments were understandably skeptical regarding the Single Manager
Program. It had not yet proved itself and it was a departure from
the accustomed way of doing business.
I am convinced that the Departments now not only accept the
Single Manager Program, bat that they endorse it and that they
are determined to correct its defects and make it work in peace
and, if necessary, in war.-
In reply to the lbover Commission and the Douglas Committee, this
13G0 progress report points out that these two groups "acknowledged that
they had not concerned themselves with questions of military strategy,
weaoonry, or tactics. They looked at logistics in a vacuum, in detach-
ment from its proper environment as an inseparable element of military
science. Because the logistics mission is an integral element of the
defense mission, the configuration of the logistics organization must be
dictated by the shape of the defense organization. In addition, the
progress report had this to say in rebuttal to defense critics.
Instead of the mammoth organization recommended by the Hoover
Commission and the Douglas Committee, and to avoid the chaotic
disruption that would attend its creation, the Department of De-
fense has. been pursuing an orderly program of logistics unification
called the Single Manager Plan. Through this plan, the logistics
system is dirided into manageable, homogeneous segments where
problems can be exposed, where intensive management can be applied,
and where solutions are worked out ay organizations in which is
concentrated the best specialized competence in the Department of
Defense. This is more sensible than trying to sweep unsolved
problems under the rug of still another bureaucracy.
3
Department of Defense, "Commodity Single Manager Progress Report,"
November, 1960, p. 1. (liiltilithed.)
2 Ibid
. , p. 10.
3 Ibid.., p.. 12.
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• e .it is not possible to identify what are regarded as
major savings achieved by Single Managers, However* annual
savings of §19.8 Million per year and one-time savings of §425
Million have beon identified in the systems presided over by
the Single Managers. These latter savings are dominated by in-
ventory drawdown . x
In summary, it is believed that the Single Manager Flan is the
common sense approach to logistics unification.
The evidence persuades us that it is economical and efficient.
It is compatible with the Defense structure because it exploits
existing capabilities, which are vitally necessary to the Military
mission, and because it operates smoothly within existing channels
of command and communication.
It is .sufficiently flexible to adjust to whatever Defense organi-
zation may emerge in the future because it unifies logically
selected entities within this structure.
Most important—the Single Manager Systems are responsive to
the needs of the combat forces.
This concept has been endorsed by the Materiel Secretaries
and the Military logisticians of the Services because:
It permits us to correct the wasteful practices for -which we
have been criticized while preserving the essential logistics
capabilities of the military forces,
2
Logistics Systems Study Project
TChile the single manager currently is one of the major defense
arguments against a central, consolidated supply agency, a great deal of
analytical research study preceded its establishment. Cut of the early
study came many materiel improvements which likewise are a part of argu-
ments against the proposals for a "Fourth Service," During 1957, one of
the more important studies developed. This was the logistics Systems
Study Project and was basically developed to determine whether progress
Department of Defense, "Commodity Single Manager Progress Report, n
November, I960, p, 44. (Uiltilithed.)
2
xoxc.,, p. <_• ., c
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was being made in meeting objectives such as those posed by the Hoover
Commission and the Congress. This study project was conceived to con-
sist of the following four phases:
Phase I - Management of Commercial and Common Items of Supply.
Phase II - Management of Common Services.
Phase III - Management of Peculiar Items of Supply,
Phase IV - Ultiraate Plan of Organization,
One of the major results of Phase I of the Logistics Studies was
the establishment of the Armed Forces Supply Support Center, This
joint organization provides a mechanism whereby the four military services
2
and the OSD level can meet together on supply matters. The purposes ana
objectives of the AFSS Center are:
1, To provide the most effective and economical administration
of certain common supply functions of the military services,
2, To promote and coordinate integrated supply management among
the military services concerned with common materiel.
3 # To develop means for the elimination of any undesirable
inconsistency, duplication a-^d overlapping among supply operations
of the military services and for the elimination of any unnecessary
administrative procedures.
3
"Excerpts from Integrating the Management of Commercial and Common
Items of Supply," Summary of Survey Team Reports on Phase 1 Studies and
Steering Group Recommendations Thereon for Consideration of The Policy
Board, Appendix D, Logistics Systems Study Project (Documents), 1 February
1958, in United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Military Supply
Management (Single Manager Agencies), hearings before subcommittee, 86th
Congress, 1st Session, 25-26 May 1959 (".Tashington: Govemment Printing
Office, 1959), pp. 515-517,
2
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Government Operations, Military Operations SubCommittee, Military Supply
Man rg ernent (Single Manager Agencies), hearings before Subcommittee, 86th
Congress, 1st Session, 25-26 May 1959 (Washington: Government Printing




Thus, while the Defense Department opposed any "Fourth Service"
concept, it was evident that the pressures of the Congress were forcing
more significant cooperation, collaboration, and improvements within
the services themselves in the handling of materiel. Important materiel
management progrsms in this area are:
Single Department Procurement Assignments (SDP).
Cataloging and Standardization.
Interservice Supply Support.
The first four single managers: Military Subsistence Supply
Agency, Military Clothing end Textile Supply Agency, Military
Medical Supply Agency, and Military Petroleum Supply Agency.
The Defense Objections
In general, the Department of Defense and the three military depart-
ments have opposed the establishment of the Defense Supply and Service
Administration, citing arguments such as the following:
(1) The objectives of the Hoover Commission give inadequate
consideration to the mission and organization of the armed services,
over-emphasize peacetime conditions, and assume a lack of efficiency
in military logistic activities.
(2) Deficiencies in the area of common supply and common service
activities have been recognized by the military departments and the
Department of Defense and actions have been taken to correct them.
(3) The establishment of the administration would lead to
duplications in both overhead and operating personnel, since two
supply organizations v.-ould be required, one for civilian items and
the other for military items. Moreover, civilians would be hired
to perform 7,rork now being accomplished by troops on practical




The expandability of a Defense Supply and Service Administra-
tion in time of war would be much less rapid than that of the armed
services, since it would not have access to personnel through the
draft, does not have reserve units available to it, and would perhaps
be subject to loss of men to the draft.
(5) Retention of civilians in vrartime on military supply and
service jobs both in the COfflJS and overseas is doubtful," particularly

under the threat of nuclear war.
(6) The separation of responsibility for logistic support
in the oversea "theatre between the military of the Defense Sup-
ply and Service Administration would limit the flexibility of
assignment of service troop units between the combat zone and
the communications zone.
(7) Military effectiveness would be jeopardized because supply
would become less responsive to command,!
Even with these objections and the action that the Department of
Defense has taken, military officials recognize that all of the arguments
and all of the studies have not yet quieted the critics of the present
military supply system. Fressures still exist for a "Fourth Service,,"
Here is what the Supply Management Reference Book said in 1953:
Despite the actions that have been taken by the Department of
Defense to integrate and coordinate the supply of common items,
a great deal of pressure still exists, particularly for establish-
ment of the "Fourth Service of Supply.""
Just how long the defense position will hold up now and in the
future is dependent on the dynamic programs for the improvement of the
military supply system being developed by the Department of Defense and
their acceptance by the Congress. The Armed Forces Supply Support Center
in 1351 is evolving into a powerful element in the supply support area
and the future of the "Fourth Service" concept may be riding with this
organization. In the next chapter, "The Situation Today" will be dis-
cussed. Perhaps, the "rose" is the "rose" is the "Fourth Service" is
the "AFSS Center." \ ...
Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Supply and Logistics), Supply T.lanagement Reference Book (Washington:







Today all eyes of the materiel managers in the Department of
Defense are focused upon the Zoned Forces Supply Support Center. Al-
though a relatively young organization within the defense hierarchy, it
has risen remarkably in prestige as a staff agent of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) and through the very
thorough studies of its analysis staff. It is within this agency where-
in the seed of a "Fourth Service" is now planted and its flowering can
possibly result in the achievement of the very force it was designed
to stop.
In 1959 and 1960 four nevr single managers were established bring-
ing the total to eight within the Department of Defense. The Armed
Forces Supply Support Center played no small role in getting these
single managers established. Aside from the materiel consolidations
that have evolved, it is interesting here to point out that today there
are three single manager agencies for services and all of them are in
the transportation field. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has
brought together military communications into a Defense Communications
Agency. It is responsible, undor his direction, authority and control,
for the "operational" control ana supervision of the Defense Communications
System. 1
In February of 1961, a very important and imposing eight-volume
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Government Operations, Military Operations Subcommittee, Military Supply
?.!anogemv;it (Progress in Single Manager Agencies), hearings before sub-
committee, 86th Congress, 2d Session, 25-26 April 1950 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, i960), p. 277.

study was released by the Armed Forces Supply Support Center which will
have a far-reaching impact on military supply systems if the recommenda-
tions are adopted* The Report on Management of Electrical/Electronics
Materiel recommended that "the Secretary of Defense establish a Defense
Electronics Management Center for the integrated materiel management of
Federal Group 59 'Electronics Equipment Components' and Federal Supply
Class 6145 *wire and cable, electrical * " Other recommendations of this
study included the following pertaining to the broadening of the responsi-
bilities and mission of the Armed Forces Supply Support Center:
5# The Secretary of Defense:
a. Expand the Charter responsibilities of the Armed Forces
Supply Support Council to include management control over the
Defense Electronics Management Center* • •
6» The Secretary of Defense include in the mission of the
Armed Forces Supply Support Center the following functions to be
performed on a continuing basis:
a* System design including procedural standardization, opera-
tional refinement, and simplification pertaining to support
operations of integrated materiel management agencies and centers.
b. Coordination and review of the operations of integrated
materiel management agencies and centers.
This Armed Forces Supply Support Center was established in 1958
with the following functions assigned:
(a) Prepare and publish federal catalog data and insure con-
version to t?.e data by the military supply system.
(b) Recommend the assignment of responsibility among the services
for the monitorship and the development of specifications for
certain categories of suoolies.
Armed Forces Supply Support Center, "Report on ?4anagemsnt of
Electrical/Electronics materiel, " Volume I, Conclusions, Recommendations,





(c) Develop and coordinate interservice operations to assure
cross-utilization of assets in order to minimize procurement,
stockage, and transportation,
(d) Conduct specific study projects of the operations of sup-
ply systems of the military services and noncommercial common items
of materiel to obtain optimum integration in the interest of in-
creased military effectiveness and economy, 1
The AFSS Council consists of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of De-
fense (Installations and Logistics) as chairman, a principal military
representative appointed by each of the four services, and the Director
of the AF3S Center, The Council is the primary authority in the center,
controlling both input and output. According to the establishing
instruction, the Council will:
(a) Approve all study and work projects
(b) Approve the appointment of key personnel
(c) Liake decisions on the findings and recommendations of
approved studies, and
(d) Make recommendations for decisions and implementation by
responsible officials of the Department of Defense, 2
Is The "Fourth Service" Here ?
Tilth these latter noted functions, the Council of the AFSS has been
basically a staff advisory agency. Adoption of the February 1961 recom-
mendations certainly make the Council a line operating body. As a matter
of interpretation, this writer considers that the February 1961 recommenda-
tions place the AFSS Council in the position of being the manager of the
single managers. And if this interpretation can be considered valid, the
^United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on
Defense Procurement, Background Materi al on Economic Aspects of Military
Pr
o
curement and Su >ply, ' 'dotn Congress, 2d "Sess'ion ('.Taskington: Government




Council can further be the core of a "Fourth Service of Supply*"
Let's look at some prognostications in this area* In 1955 the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics), Mr* Robert
C* Lanphier, Jr*, was asked this question at the Industrial College of
the Armed' Forces
:
QUESTION: As more and more of these commodities come under
the single manager system, is there any plan to create a manager
of the single managers, so as to make sure they are all singing
off the same sheet of music?
Mr. Lanphier: When you have that, fellow, you have your
fourth service of supply*^
In 1958, Colonel Frank A* Osmanski writing on "A Fourth Service
of Supply?" prophesied the following:
There is the possibility that the Single Manager Agencies might
all be consolidated into a centralized supply agency, into which
might even be incorporated some of the current logistics functions
of OSD such as standardization and cataloging* Such an agency most
likely would be directly administered by OSD but not have a separate
departmental status* If such a possibility were to eventuate—
and the trend indicated above with respect to the standardization
of the Single Manager Agencies already predisposes them to such-
easy consolidation—-a hybrid Fourth Service would emerge, drawing
its personnel from the present military departments but nonetheless
beyond their direct control,-
In I960 the possibility of the Armed Forces Supply Support Center
serving as a nucleus for a common-use supply and service agency was indi-
cated in material prepared for the Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of
the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress* The situation today is
certainly colored further by the prognostication noted here:
1
Ibbert C* Lanphier, Jr., Singl e Manager Flan, Publication Ho.
L5S-63 ("Jashingtcu: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 23 November
1955), p. 48*
9
Prank A* Or.: :-.,;>!, Colonel, "A Fourth Service of Supply?" Military
F^vievr, U, S, 5rmy CJoraaand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth'/"
Kansas, June, 195S, p, 19*
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Organization for a common-use supply and service agency.
A. Functions. It has been suggested by supporters of the
common-use supply and service agency that the recently established
Armed Forces Supply Support Center. • •might very well serve as a
nucleus for the" proposed agency. 3&e next step would be the trans-
fer of responsibility to the agency over all presently established
single manager commodity and service areas. From this start the
agency would, on r„ phased basis:
1. Develop single manager arrangements for all homogeneous
categories of supplies except for the management of certain items
that should remain with the services, such as engineering and
operational essential items. Each single manager will be responsi-
ble to and receive direction from the central agency. In other
words the agency would provide centralized management but de-
centralised operation would be carried on by the various single
managers.
2. Develop single manager arrangements for common service activi-
ties, tc be transferred to the agency, as appropriate.
3* Maintain pipeline ownership of materiel in a stock fund until
issued for use to consuming activities of the services at which
point they would reimburse the stock fund and charge their respective
appropriations.
4. Operate its own storage facilities. This vail require the
transfer of certain warehouses now operated by the services.
5. Determine the mission of each single manager and its
corresponding stock control points. Each single manager 7dll have
the responsibility of performing certain primary functions of
supply for all the services, including inventory control, net
requirements determination, purchase and distribution.
6. Utilize GSA facilities to the fullest extent practicable on
specified items of supply that do not have a mobilization require-
ment.!
The actions recommended in the February 1961 report of the Armed
Forces Supply Support Center, if approved, Till result in military
supply support operations and management structures evolving toward
United States Congress, Joint Economic Cbmnittee,, Subcommittee on
Defense Procurement, Background ?.taterjal on Economic Aspects of Military
Procurement and Supply, 36th Congress, 2d Session (V»"ashington: Govern-"
Sent Printing Office, 1960), p» 73.
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fuller integrated materiel management for effective joint logistics. The
report concludes that "Ir/ 1964, the Single Manager Operating Agencies and
DEMC vrill assume a joint role in performing the functions of supply,
formerly performed by the separate service supply systems, for 40 percent
of the 3,700,000 items in the Department of Defense." As for the AFSS
Council, the following is written:
The AFSS Council will as same a primary role in the coordinated
management of Defense logistics, DoD policy guidance rail be pro-
vided through the chairmanship,, Guidance as to the configuration .
of military materiel structures wedded to strategy and tactics
will be provided through JOS representation. Military service
mission and logistical considerations will be provided through
service representation.
The AFSS Council, with increased authority, commensurate with
its new stature, will in addition to current responsibilities
assume management of DEMC; provide operational coordination of
the SMOA'sj and direct the development and implementation of inte-
grated materiel management procedural concepts**
Thus, it is concluded that the "Fourth Service" is practically here
today—not as a separate military department but as an agency under the
Secretary of Defense with civilian control and staffed by military
personnel of the three military departments "but nonetheless beyond their
direct control," ?he agency designed as a buffer against a "Fourth
Service of Supply" is emerging with all the attributes and characteristics
of the hybrid "Fourth Service" prophesied by Colonel Osnanski in 1958,
If it picks up strength in its centralized powers, it appears to be only
a small step tc make the next move by amputation of the "hybrid"
qualification.
Armed Forces Supply Support Center, "Report on Management of
Eroctrical/Electronics Materiel," Volume I, .Conclusions, Recommendations,







Khile the boundaries of this subject are almost limitless and the
material written on military supply management not at all brief, this
research paper has not delved in any detail into the arguments involving
strategy, tactics, end logistics as they pertain to a "Fourth Service of
Supply." Nor has this paper examined the reasons and the need for
civilian control of military materiel management* In view of this, hovr-
ever, with the growing strength of the Armed Forces Supply Support Council
and Center, a question appears to be constantly thought of but has never
been noted in the mass of military management literature. This question
simply is: Y?hy is the materiel management organisation growing as it is
Within the Department of Defense under the civilian control of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) rather than
under a revamped, revitalized J- 4 Logistics Directorate of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff?
In summary, a hybrid "Fourth Service of Supply" is considered present
in the Armed Forces Supply Support Council and Center* As the pressures
continue to mount, it is not hard to visualize the dropping of the "hybrid"
adjective. This hybrid "Fourth Service" is currently staffed with
military and civilian personnel with civilian control definitely at the
top. This structure can be precarious and the next evolvement in the
military materiel arguments may hinge on civilian control versus military
control with more and more interest being manifested by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
In this inquiry, the "Fourth Service of Supply has been shown to
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be a wide variety of ideas end concepts and, to a degree, means many-
things to many people , Basically, however, the "Fourth Service" in
this paper has been considered as a concept of centralised direction and
control of materiel by the Department of Defense. The pressures for such
a centralised approach to military materiel management have been applied
almost constantly in the last two decades by Congressional committees and
the Second Hoover Commission and its adherents. In response to this
pressure, it has been shown that the Department of Defense has aggressive-
ly opposed a "Fourth Service" and has reacted by establishing many pro-
grams and studies designed for more effective, economical, and efficient
management of military materiel*
The Armed Forces Supply Support Center is emerging from the defense
management programs as a powerful organization of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (installations and Logistics). Up until the recent Report on
Management of Electrical/Electronics Materiel, this Center with its
directing Council was considered primarily a staff agency. If the Report
is approved, this staff position will be changed for the recommendations
involve the placement of the Armed Forces Supoly Support Council in a
line position directing, among other units, the single managers and the
Defense Electronics Management Center,
The author considers this AFSS Council to be the core of what is
now a hybrid "Fourth Service of Supply," i.e. a central agency directing
supply effort staffed jointly by civilian and military personnel from the
several services but beyond their control. All that has transpired thus
far in this area within the Department of Defense has been, to a very
large measure, due fco the political pressures of the Congress* As has
boon she ra, these pressures are not subsiding. It certainly appears that

the Congressional mood, is slanted toward a single agency running supply
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